IRS attempts to help cannabis industry taxpayers understand their tax obligations likely signal an increased interest in enforcement, according to practitioners.

Jonathan Kalinski of Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez PC told Tax Notes that the information in the FAQ is well known to the state-legal marijuana industry, but “’the IRS doesn’t just pop up — even though this is brief — a Q&A just for the heck of it.'”

To read full article Click Here.

Posted by: Taxlitigator | October 1, 2020

UCLA 36th Annual Tax Controversy Institute – October 20, 2020

Please join Sandra R. Brown, former Acting United States Attorney, as she moderates a panel featuring IRS Director of Fraud Enforcement Damon Rowe and IRS CI Special Agent in Charge Ryan Korner, entitled “What Every Practitioner Needs to Know to Protect Their Clients and Themselves From Civil Fraud Penalties and Criminal Investigations”, to be webcast on October 20, 2020 at 2:15-3:30 PM (PST). Also joining the panel are Nathan Hochman, former Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Tax Division and Evan Davis, former DOJ Tax Division trial attorney and Assistant United States Attorney, CDCA. This “can’t miss” panel is part of UCLA’s 36th Annual Tax Controversy Institute which annually brings together leading tax practitioners and government officials to discuss current topics in areas of civil and criminal tax controversy.  

Other “can’t miss” panels include:

  • Employment Tax Enforcement- How AB 5 Has Changed the Employment Tax World.
  • Handling the Case of the High Income Non-Filer—What to do….What to do?
  • Handling Your Tax Court Matter in the COVID-19 Environment
  • The Tax Problems Caused by COVID-19 and the Best Practices to Handle Them
  • “Handling the Cannabis Tax Examination—What is Different and What is Not”
  • LB&I’s New High Wealth Examinations-Is there Really Gold in Them Hills

For more information Click Here.

Law360 — Included in Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s monumental legacy are several tax opinions in which she addressed whether a California corporate
franchise tax violates the U.S. Constitution, how states can tax citizens and when employment taxes apply to baseball players’ back pay.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a panel discussion at Georgetown University Law Center last October, part of a lecture series named for her. She appeared with former President Bill Clinton and former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton.

For Full Article Click Here.

Posted by: Taxlitigator | September 15, 2020

UCLA 36th Annual Tax Controversy Institute – October 20, 2020

The 36th Annual UCLA Extension Tax Controversy Institute is right around the corner on October 20th. This year the Institute will be virtual and we have an all star line up of Government representatives and private practitioners who will discuss the cutting edge issues in tax controversy.

We are pleased to announce that Commissioner of Internal Revenue Charles P. Rettig will be giving a luncheon keynote on the state of the IRS.
Join us for an interview with the new Chief of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division Jim Lee and attend panel discussions with SBSE Deputy Commissioners De Lon Harris and Darren Guillot on the current state of examination and collection enforcement.

We will also have panels on the anticipated High Wealth examinations and the IRS approach to non-filers. We will conclude the day with an in-depth discussion of the IRS new Office of Fraud Investigations, including its new Director Damon Rowe and the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles Field Office of the Criminal Investigation Division, Ryan Korner

Please join us. Click Here for more information.

Posted by: sbbrown64 | August 28, 2020

SANDRA BROWN Quoted in in LAW360 on IRS New Fraud Office

The novel coronavirus pandemic isn’t delaying the rampup of the Internal Revenue Service’s recently launched office to combat tax fraud, the office’s director told Law360 in a recent interview.

The former head of the IRS criminal investigation unit is now the director of its new fraud enforcement office. (AP)

Though the pandemic has affected the way the IRS’ Office of Fraud Enforcement communicates, it won’t delay setting up the unit, said Damon Rowe, a former senior official in the IRS’ Criminal Investigation Division. The office plans to have a team of 42 fraud enforcement advisers — revenue agents and officers — hired and on board nationwide in 30 to 45 days, said Rowe, who was tapped to head the fraud office in March.

For Full Article Click Here.

In Badgley v. U.S, 957 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2020), the 9th Circuit addressed the unfortunate fact pattern when a taxpayer dies prior to the termination of a lengthy (15-year) grantor-retained annuity trust (“GRAT”).

As background, GRATs allow a grantor to transfer property to a beneficiary in trust while retaining the right to an annuity for a specified term of years.  In the year of the transfer, the grantor is taxed on a gift for the difference between the transferred property and the value of the annuity retained, as computed under the regulations.  At the end of the term, the GRAT dissolves and the property is transferred to the beneficiaries.  Id. at 972. This transfer can be free of estate tax, and with a gift tax that is diminished or even eliminated. Id.  This works to effectively transfer any appreciation of the underlying property in the GRAT if the assets sufficiently appreciate.  This estate and gift planning approach can be attractive at times, such as now, when the interest rates are very low, thereby permitting lower annuity payments, or when assets are either depressed or may significantly appreciate in the future.  The grantor, however, risks that either the property does not appreciate, or that the grantor dies.  Here, the grantor died and the executor of her estate sought to not be taxable on a retained interest.

The 9th Circuit reviewed the District Court’s holding that a decedent’s retained annuity interest from the GRAT both retained a right to income from and permitted continued enjoyment of the property.  Id. at 974.   The 9th Circuit reviewed the lower court decision de novo and held that the government correctly included the entire date-of-death value of the GRAT in the decedent’s gross estate.   Id. at 972.

The Court addressed the taxpayer’s primary argument that the annuity flowing from the GRAT operated as a substitute for a will to relinquish possession and enjoyment of the property, thereby avoiding the force of § 2036(a).  To relinquish the property, the grantor must “absolutely, unequivocally, and without possible reservations, part[ ] with all of his title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property … [and the transfer] must be unaffected by whether the grantor lives or dies.” Commissioner v. Church’s Estate, 335 U.S. 632 at 645–46.  Accordingly, § 2036(a)(1) focuses on both the grantor, who must completely divest herself of possession, enjoyment, and income, and the beneficiaries, whose interest must “take effect” prior to the grantor’s death. See id. at 637.

Ultimately, the decedent’s annuity was a substantial present economic benefit, requiring inclusion of the GRATs date-of-death value in her estate.  The Court noted that the partnership interest was the only property in the GRAT, and the annuity stemmed from that property interest.  Since decedent died before the termination of the GRAT, the property was not transferred to its beneficiaries before her death thus it remained tied to her by the string she created.  Id. at 973.  Query whether the result may have been different if the asset was transferred for an arms-length note that constituted bona fide indebtedness.  Various other arguments, such as the formula in Treasury Regulation §20.2036-1(c)(2) to calculate the portion of property includable under §2036(a), were rejected by the Court.

While GRATs present potential estate planning benefits (particularly in light of the low §7520 interest rate), the benefits and consequences under the Internal Revenue Code provisions and related regulations hinge on the value of the assets put in trust, the value of the retained annuity interests, and the life expectancy.  While it was possible to have a shorter trust, the taxpayer opted for a longer trust period and arguably retained interests in the property.  Ultimately, the decedent’s remaining strings to the property in the GRAT resulted in the property not being transferred to the beneficiaries, thus remaining in her estate.

Cory Stigile – For more information please contact Cory Stigile – stigile@taxlitigator.com  Mr. Stigile is a principal at Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez P.C., a CPA licensed in California, the past-President of the Los Angeles Chapter of CalCPA and a Certified Specialist in Taxation Law by The State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization. Mr. Stigile specializes in tax controversies as well as tax, business, and international tax. His representation includes Federal and state controversy matters and tax litigation, including sensitive tax-related examinations and investigations for individuals, business enterprises, partnerships, limited liability companies, and corporations. His practice also includes complex civil tax examinations. Additional information is available at www.taxlitigator.com

Tenzing Tunden is a Tax Associate at Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez P.C. Mr. Tunden recently graduated from the Graduate Tax Program at NYU School of Law and the J.D. Program at UC Davis School of Law. During law school, Mr. Tunden served as an intern at the Franchise Tax Board Legal Division and at the Tax Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office (N.D. Cal).

Under the People First Initiative, the IRS asserted it would generally not start new examinations, except for situations with short statutes of limitations.  As the relief provisions of the People First Initiative waned after July 15, 2020, the IRS has resumed collection activities in earnest, and presumably will also begin new examinations.  The IRS has been quite vocal on certain examinations areas such as high income non-filers, micro-captives, and conservation easements.  The IRS has also signaled a re-invigorated fraud referral process in these areas.

While these areas of IRS and congressional interest will undoubtedly continue to get attention, the IRS is continuing to build on expertise to conduct examinations of other substantive areas, including Section 41 research credits.  Last November at the California Lawyers Association Taxation Section’s annual meeting, Chief Counsel Michael Desmond described how the IRS has increased enforcement in the research credit space, in response to potentially aggressive positions taken by taxpayers.  In describing these examinations, he noted the complexities in the statute, as well as the need to understand each taxpayers’ business to determine if the credits were appropriate.  These are highly factual examinations.

Similarly, at last November’s CalCPA Committee of Taxation IRS liaison meeting, a group of Small Business/Self Employed and Large Business and International (“LB&I”) managers, and an IRS Counsel attorney, presented on the complexities involved with examining or developing research credits cases.  As the IRS was dedicating resources to the research credit area, at least prior to COVID-19, we can anticipate that these examinations are not going away.  Moreover, as the examinations involve non-traditional tax or accounting questions, and rely on principles of science, engineering, computer science, or other fields, experts will be involved in the examination, including IRS engineers.

In September 2017, the IRS released LB&I Directive I-04-0917-005 (the “Directive”), which provided guidance to LB&I examiners regarding examination of the credit for increasing research activities under Section 41.  This Directive intended to provide an efficient manner of determining qualified research expenses (“QREs”) for LB&I taxpayers that meet certain specific requirements and to more efficiently manage LB&I’s audit resources.  This Directive only applies to LB&I taxpayers who follow U.S. GAAP to prepare their Certified Audited Financial Statements which show as a separate line item on the income statement the amount of the currently expensed ASC 730 Financial Statement R&D. ASC 730 R&D is made up of the research and development costs currently expensed on a taxpayer’s Audited Financial Statements pursuant for U.S. GAAP purposes, and includes certain specified adjustments.  Given the rigor applied in determining these classifications for GAAP purposes, the Directive permitted examiners to accept as sufficient evidence of QREs the ASC 730 Financial Statement R&D for the Credit Year, thus saving significant examination resources and permitting additional certainty for taxpayers.

While the IRS Directive provides clarity for some taxpayers, any additional amounts of QREs claimed by a taxpayer on its Form 6765 for the Credit Year over the ASC 730 Financial Statement R&D amount are subject an examination, if warranted.  While many Revenue Agents have focused on working existing examinations, albeit with an appreciation for extended information document request deadlines, anticipate that new examinations will commence and the IRS will deploy the resources that it has signaled over the last few years, and in particular last fall.

CORY STIGILE – For more information please contact Cory Stigile – stigile@taxlitigator.com  Mr. Stigile is a principal at Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez P.C., a CPA licensed in California, the past-President of the Los Angeles Chapter of CalCPA and a Certified Specialist in Taxation Law by The State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization. Mr. Stigile specializes in tax controversies as well as tax, business, and international tax. His representation includes Federal and state controversy matters and tax litigation, including sensitive tax-related examinations and investigations for individuals, business enterprises, partnerships, limited liability companies, and corporations. His practice also includes complex civil tax examinations. Additional information is available at www.taxlitigator.com

For years, Beck Asset Management ($26M in AUM) in Zurich has made an unusual disclosure in its Form ADV out “of an abundance of caution.”

The firm’s latest Form ADV reveals that “Josef Beck works as Investment Advisor for Beck Verwaltungen AG (“BVAG”), an entity that is under common control with Beck AM only because it shares a single board member with BVAG.” It goes on to state that the U.S. indicted Beck in 2012 on criminal charges related to helping wealthy Americans avoid taxes.

For Full Article (page 7) Click Here.

 

 

We are pleased to announce that Steven Toscher and Jonathan Kalinski will be speaking at the upcoming CalCPA Cannabis Industry Virtual Symposium webinar on Criminal Tax Issues/Going Through an IRS Audit, Friday, August 7, 2020, 1:45 p.m.
COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on the economy, and the cannabis sector was not immune. Supply chains and distribution were disrupted, revenues were hit hard and labor has been impacted. Join us Aug. 7 for the Cannabis Industry Virtual Symposium, where you’ll learn about tax, legal and accounting updates impacting cannabis industry businesses and their professional advisors. You’ll gain an understanding of new and recently implemented policies, practical insights to serving cannabis-industry clients and walk away with ideas from accounting experts, attorneys and business owners.
Learn about the tax, legal and accounting information relevant to the cannabis industry. A significant increase in cannabis industry activity is here which leads to an increase and demand for professional services. Attend to gain an understanding of new and recently implemented policies, practical insights to serving cannabis-industry clients and get takeaways from accounting experts, attorneys and business owners.

 

Click Here for full information.

On March 21, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its much awaited decision in Marinello, and in doing so, imposed significant limitations on the government’s ability to bring obstruction charges in tax cases under the so-called Omnibus Clause of 26 U.S.C. § 7202(a).  Since that time, tax practitioners have been watching to see how impactful the decision would be on the government’s charging decisions in criminal tax cases.  Part of the watching also involved waiting for updates to the U.S. Justice Department’s Criminal Tax Manual (“CTM”) concerning the scope of Section 7212(a)’s Omnibus Clause.[i]  Earlier this month, the Tax Division ended the waiting and issued Chapter 17 of the CTM to specifically address the impact of Marinello on prosecutorial decisions involving charges contemplated by the Omnibus Clause of Section 7212(a).[ii]

Background of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) & Marinello

IRC § 7212(a) prohibits acts that obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code.[iii]  This statutory provision is referred to as the “Omnibus Clause.”

In 2018, the Supreme Court in Marinello reviewed the scope of the Omnibus Clause as a result of a split in the Circuit.  The split was significantly more favorable to the government, in that, only in decisions rendered by the Sixth Circuit were judicial limits being placed on charges prosecuted under the Omnibus Clause.  All other courts of appeals considering the issue had upheld a more generous interpretation of the Omnibus Clause and thus, affirmed convictions of defendants prosecuted for actions that occurred before, or even in the absence of, an IRS audit or investigation.[iv]

The decision in Marinello significantly narrowed the approach of the majority of the Circuits,  holding that § 7212(a) obstruction charges required that the government prove the defendant was aware of a pending tax-related proceeding or that the defendant could “reasonably foresee that such a proceeding would commence”, and that the government also establish a “nexus” between the defendant’s acts and the investigation.[v]  The Marinello Court made clear that the Omnibus Clause as a whole must involve actions intended to interfere with targeted tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation or audit.[vi]

Prosecutorial Discretion in Tax Cases

As noted above, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Marinello, a majority of the courts supported an expansive reading of the Omnibus Clause, thus leaving charging decisions under this statute largely up to the discretion of prosecutors.  This discretion, more often than not, did evidence a fair amount of restraint by prosecutors such that charges under Section 7212(a) were limited to actions occurring after an IRS audit or overt tax investigation had begun.

To provide further context as to the limits on prosecutorial discretion in criminal tax cases, it is worth noting that approval to file a federal tax charges is, in most instances, ultimately overseen by the Tax Division, as Tax Division authorization is required to prosecute crimes arising under Title 26.  As part of the Tax Division’s oversight of tax cases, in addition to providing the basic foundation for national consistency in charging decisions, the Tax Division makes its policies and directives available to both prosecutors and the public in the CTM.  Again, worth noting, the CTM, in general, “provides only internal Department of Justice guidance.  It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.  Nor does the CTM place any limitations on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”[vii]

The CTM does, however, provide uniform, internal guidance in charging decisions, including Tax Division Directives which speak directly to prosecutorial decisions in charging violations of Title 26.  Violations of Title 26, of course, include charges involving the Omnibus Clause of § 7212(a).[viii]

The CTM has, for over 30 years, specifically included directives relevant to § 7212(a).  Tax Division Directive 77, issued in 1989, created DOJ’s self-imposed limitations on charging a violation of § 7212(a), stating the charge “should be reserved for conduct occurring after a tax return has been filed- typically conduct designed to impede or obstruct an audit or criminal tax investigation”.[ix]   Tax Division Directive 129, issued in 2004, to supersede Directive 77, set forth that a § 7212(a) charge was most appropriate for corrupt conduct intended to impede an IRS audit or investigation such as “providing false information, destroying evidence, attempting to influence a witness to give false testimony, and harassing an IRS employee.”[x]  The Tax Division’s recent issuance of the updated Chapter 17 in the CTM, as such, is intended to provide such information to not only the public, but also federal prosecutors considering charges under the Omnibus Clause of § 7212(a) in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello.

Criminal Tax Manual – Updated Chapter 17

 Chapter 17 begins with the statutory language of IRC § 7212[xi] and an explanation of the code section and Marinello.[xii] The chapter continues with the Tax Division’s policy, which is stated as follows – “an Omnibus Clause charge should… be based on acts of commission and not acts of omission.”   Here are the highlights:

Section 17.04 analyzes, generally, the elements of the omnibus clause as construed in Marinello. It provides a more detailed explanation of the case and the Court’s findings. It also provides a brief description of United States v. Aguilar[xiii] in relation to Marinello.

Section 17.04[1] discusses the Omnibus Clause’s means rea requirement as “corruptly” rather than “willfully” and notes that Marinello did not alter the definition of “corruptly.”

Section 17.04[2] discusses the second element of the Omnibus Clause – an “endeavor.” The manual notes that Marinello “did not purport to place any categorical limitations on the types of ‘endeavors.’”

Section 17.04[3] discusses “Omissions as Endeavors.” In Marinello, the government suggested the Supreme Court limit the Omnibus Clause’s scope by excluding omissions from the scope of the statute.[xiv]  However, the Court opted to limit scope by requiring a nexus to a pending or foreseeable proceeding, leaving open the question of whether an Omnibus Clause conviction could be predicated upon an omission. “Against this legal backdrop” the Tax Division has decided that Omnibus Clause prosecutions would not be based on omissions without the express authorization of the Tax Division.

Section 17.04[4] discusses “Targeted Administrative IRS Action.”  The Supreme Court did not provide an exhaustive list of administrative conduct that would fall within the scope of the Omnibus Clause, but did make specific reference to both “investigations” and “audits.”[xv]  The section refers to United States v. Miner[xvi] for further guidance on this issue. Miner explained that knowledge of pending IRS collection activities against a taxpayer, including notices of deficiency, notices of tax past due, and federal tax liens falls within the scope.[xvii]  United States v. Faller provides further guidance by finding that a taxpayer’s knowledge that the IRS had taken steps to collect unpaid income taxes was sufficient to fall within scope.[xviii]  Finally, United States v. Westbrooks adds within the scope a taxpayer who provides false testimony at a hearing to show cause where a court had to determine a taxpayer’s compliance with an IRS subpoena for tax records.[xix]

 

Section 17.04[5] discusses the “Pending or Reasonably Foreseeable” requirements.  The Marinello Court stated that the administrative proceeding intended to be obstructed or impeded must be “pending at the time the defendant engaged in obstructive conduct or, at the least, was then reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.”[xx]  Marinello slightly expanded the Andersen ruling to state that “it is not enough for the Government to claim that the defendant knew the IRS may catch on to his unlawful scheme eventually,” but “the proceeding must at least be in the offing.”[xxi]

Section 17.04[6] discusses the “‘Nexus’ Between Conduct and a Particular Administrative Proceeding.” Marinello did not analyze how the government would prove a nexus and did not require proof of a nexus between the corrupt endeavor and the IRS’ administrative proceedings with regards to a specific tax year or period.  Rather, the government must prove a “‘nexus’ between the defendant’s conduct and a particular administrative proceeding.”[xxii]  Marinello used the definition of “nexus” from United States v. Aguilar.[xxiii]

Section 17.04[7] discusses “Pleading Violations of the Omnibus Clause under Marinello.”  The Tax Division’s position is that “the nexus requirement is one of proof and does not constitute a newly created core element that must be expressly and separately pled in the indictment in order to state an offense.”  However, to avoid issues in the future, the manual recommends that indictments should “at least allege facts showing that the nexus-to-a-pending-or-foreseeable-proceeding requirement is satisfied…”  The manual provides a model indictment form which expressly alleges a nexus to a pending or foreseeable proceeding.

Section 17.04[8] titled “Jury Instructions after Marinello” states that the “nexus-to-a-pending-or-reasonably-foreseeable-proceeding” requirement must be reflected in jury instructions. Section 17.04[8][a] titled “Specific Unanimity of Corrupt Endeavors” states that although a jury must unanimously agree that all elements of the offense have been proven, the jury does not have to be unanimous with regards to the particular means by which the offense was committed.

Section 17.04[9] discusses “Unit of Prosecution.” Though not expressly stated, Marinello assumes that the Officer Clause and Omnibus Clause of IRC 7212(a) state two separate offenses.[xxiv] Marinello did not address other interpretations.

Section 17.05 discusses “Venue” but acknowledges that “courts have not yet addressed whether Marinello’s holding that the government must prove a nexus to a targeted tax-related proceeding provides a basis for venue in a district where such a proceeding is pending, in addition to any district where a corrupt endeavor took place.”

Section 17.06 titled “Statute of Limitations” states that the statute of limitations for a violation of the Omnibus Clause is six years from the last act that constitutes a violation.

Conclusion

 The Tax Division’s CTM, which is part of the Justice Manual, is important to ensuring that Department of Justice policies are not only available to all DOJ components and employees to facilitate government efficiency and overall consistency in the execution of their sworn duties, but also provides transparency to the public.  The Tax Division’s updated Chapter 17, to address the Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello, provides further insight into the circumstances when a charge under the Omnibus Clause of Section 7212(a), will most likely be deemed appropriate.

Sandra R. Brown is a Principal at Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez P.C.  Prior to joining the firm, Ms. Brown served as the Acting United States Attorney, the First Assistant United States Attorney and the Chief of the Tax Division of the Office of the U.S. Attorney (C.D. Cal)  Ms. Brown  specializes in representing individuals and organizations who are involved in criminal tax investigations, including related grand jury matters, court litigation and appeals, as well as representing and advising taxpayers involved in complex and sophisticated civil tax controversies, including representing and advising taxpayers in sensitive-issue audits and administrative appeals, as well as civil litigation in federal, state and tax court. 

Gary Markarian is an Associate at Hochman Salkin Toscher Perez P.C., and a graduate of the joint JD/LL.M. Taxation program at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. While in law school, Mr. Markarian served as an intern at the Tax Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office (C.D. Cal) and Internal Revenue Service Office of Chief Counsel’s Large Business and International Division.

[i] Sandra R. Brown, A Taxing Impediment, L.A. Law.,  Jan. 2019, at 24, 29, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2019-issues/january-2019.pdf.

[ii]  Criminal Tax Manual at Chapter 17.

[iii] 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) provides, in relevant part, “Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.”

[iv] See Dep’t of Just., Crim. Tax Manual, 3.00, Note 3, Tax Div. Pol’y Directives & Memoranda, 49 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2014/08/05/CTM%20Chapter%203.pdf#Directive %20No.%20129.

[v]  United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).

[vi]  United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1104.

[vii] Criminal Tax Manual at Title Page 0. https://www.justice.gov/tax/foia-library/criminal-tax-manual-title-page-0

[viii] See Justice Manual, formerly United States Attorney’s Manual, 6-4.200 – Tax Division Jurisdiction and Procedures, available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-6-4000-criminal-tax-case-procedures#6-4.200.

[ix] See United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998).

[x] See Dep’t of Just., Crim. Tax Manual, 3.00 Tax Div. Pol’y Directives & Memoranda, 49 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2014/08/05/CTM%20Chapter%203.pdf#Directive %20No.%20129.

[xi] CTM 17.01.

[xii] CTM 17.02.

[xiii] United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).

[xiv] Sup. Ct. Tr. Pp. 59-63.

[xv] United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1110.

[xvi] United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2014).

[xvii] United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d at 346.

[xviii] United States v. Faller, 675 Fed App’x 557 (6th Cir. 2017).

[xix] United States v. Westbrooks, 728 Fed. App’x 379 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

[xx] United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1110 (citing Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 554 U.S. 696, 703, 707-08 (2005)).

[xxi] United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1110.

[xxii] United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1109.

[xxiii] United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1109 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).

[xxiv] United States v. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1104-05.

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